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 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FROM AN 
EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF 





The right way to interpret so-called 'umbrella clauses' has 
been debated for over a decade.  Interpreted restrictively, these 
clauses merely reinforce the substantive commitments and 
protections listed in the remainder of the investment treaties in which 
they are found.  An expansive interpretation on the other hand gives 
these clauses the effect of elevating purely contractual obligations 
undertaken by the state vis-à-vis specific investors to full-blown 
treaty obligations under international law, subject to the investment 
treaty's dispute settlement provisions. Although an expansive reading 
seems to have gained considerable ground amongst investment 
arbitration tribunals over the years, this article will show that the 
consequences of such an interpretation still differ materially in 
practice by looking at (i) what happens to the dispute resolution 
mechanism of the investment treaty when there is also an exclusive 
forum selection clause in the underlying contract between a state and 
a foreign investor, and (ii) what type of obligations can be elevated 
via umbrella clauses. Both states and investors are advised to take 
these practical implications into consideration when entering into 
investment agreements or treaties. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For over a decade, investment arbitration tribunals have 
been divided over the best way to interpret so-called umbrella clauses.  
                                                
 * LL.M. (Stanford Law School), J.D. (Ghent University). 
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Found in many bilateral investment treaties (BITs), umbrella clauses 
typically provide that contracting states explicitly agree to meet 
certain obligations undertaken vis-à-vis investors from counter-party 
states.1  While some investment arbitration tribunals maintain that an 
umbrella clause merely reinforces the substantive commitments listed 
in its respective investment treaty, such as the commitment of the 
host-state to treat foreign investors in a fair and equitable way, others 
have read such clauses more broadly to enforce obligations beyond 
those explicitly mentioned in the treaty.  
The split between restrictive and expansive interpretations 
of umbrella clauses comes up in a situation where a host-state has 
entered into certain obligations with an investor in addition to those 
listed in the investment treaty—for example, by executing a 
production-sharing contract with a specific foreign investor.  If the 
host-state does not subsequently fulfill its contractual obligations 
towards that investor, the latter arguably has a claim against the host-
state for breach of contract.  This contract-based claim can be 
distinguished from a traditional treaty-based claim, such as an 
alleged breach of an investment treaty’s mutually guaranteed 
standards of protection for investors.2  It is undisputed that treaty-
based claims can be adjudicated under the auspices of the dispute 
resolution mechanism designated in the investment treaty (typically 
by referring them to the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID)).  However, by adopting an expansive 
interpretation of umbrella clauses, purely contract-based claims could 
also be brought under the auspices of the investment treaty’s dispute 
settlement provisions.   
Over time, the debate has gradually subsided in favor of an 
expansive reading.3  Rather than advancing one interpretation over 
the other, this article will focus on what such interpretations mean for 
                                                
1 An example of an umbrella clause can be found in the BIT between the 
United States and Romania: “Each Party shall observe any obligation it may 
have entered into with regard to investments.”  Treaty with Romania 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 
U.S.-Rom., art. II, ¶ 2, May 28, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO.  102-36 (1992) 
[hereinafter U.S.-Rom. BIT]. 
 2 For example, a violation of the host-state’s obligation to protect the 
foreign investor from arbitrary or discriminatory measures or its obligation to 
guarantee the foreign investor equal national treatment. 
 3 See Jude Anthony, Umbrella Clauses Since SGS v. Pakistan and SGS 
v. Philippines – A Developing Consensus, 29 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 
607, 607 (2013).  
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the debate’s practical implications for its stakeholders, namely 
sovereigns and investors.  The following section will first provide a 
brief overview of the main arguments invoked by tribunals and 
scholars for both restrictive and expansive interpretations.  Section 
III will then discuss how investment arbitration tribunals favoring 
expansive interpretations have decided cases involving claims 
brought under umbrella clauses, focusing on two issues that are still 
controversial amongst them.  First, what is the relationship between 
an exclusive forum selection clause in a contract between a host-state 
and an investor and the dispute settlement provision in the applicable 
investment treaty?  Second, which types of obligations are elevated 
to the level of an investment treaty breach?  Would a unilateral 
promise of a host-state to share with a foreign investor a certain cost 
related to the investment qualify as an “obligation” that can be 
elevated to an obligation under the relevant investment treaty, or 
would contractual obligations be required?  Section IV will conclude 
by discussing the practical implications of differing expansive 
interpretations of umbrella clauses and thereby offer 
recommendations for both investors and states. 
 
II. DEBATE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF UMBRELLA 
CLAUSES 
 
As the ICSID tribunal in BIVAC B.V. v. Paraguay aptly 
explained, “there is no jurisprudence constante on the effect of 
umbrella clauses[;] . . . the subject is one on which legal opinion is 
divided.” 4   The debate began a good ten years ago when two 
tribunals—deciding shortly after one another—reached vastly 
different outcomes when dealing with an umbrella clause in SGS v. 
Pakistan5 and SGS v. Philippines.6  Both cases addressed the question 
of whether the host-state’s commitments referenced in the respective 
                                                
 4 Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment & Control, BIVAC 
B.V. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 141 (May 29, 2009), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0103.pdf. 
 5 Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 172–73 (Aug. 6, 
2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406 (2005). 
 6 Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 128 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 
ICSID Rep. 518 (2005). 
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investment treaties’ umbrella clause also included “obligations 
arising under otherwise independent investment contracts between 
the investor and the host State.”7  If the answer was “yes” (utilizing 
an expansive umbrella clause interpretation as adopted in SGS v. 
Philippines), breach of the host state’s contractual commitments 
would amount to a breach of the BIT and the matter would be subject 
to ICSID jurisdiction.8  In the alternative (utilizing a restrictive 
interpretation as adopted in SGS v. Pakistan), the local forum would 
adjudicate the investor’s contractual claim.9 
 
A. RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION 
 
In SGS v. Pakistan, the claimant argued for an expansive 
interpretation of the umbrella clause contained in Article 11 of the 
Switzerland-Pakistan BIT, which reads: “[e]ither Contracting Party 
shall constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has 
entered into with respect to the investments of the investors of the 
other Contracting Party.”10  The arbitration tribunal rejected the 
argument that Article 11 “elevated” SGS’s contractual claims to 
treaty claims, subject to ICSID jurisdiction.11   
Still the leading case, SGS v. Pakistan summarizes some of 
the key arguments in favor of a narrow interpretation of umbrella 
clauses.  The first is a “floodgate” argument, pointing to the far-
reaching consequences an expansive interpretation would create.  
Namely, an expansive view would make umbrella clauses 
“susceptible of almost indefinite expansion” and “so far-reaching in 
scope, and so automatic and unqualified and sweeping in their 
operation, so burdensome in their potential impact upon a 
Contracting Party, we believe that clear and convincing evidence 
must be adduced.”12  The tribunal concluded that no evidence of such 
                                                
 7 Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of 
Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing 
and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 135, 136–37 (2006). 
 8 See SGS v. Phil., Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 129–31; SGS v. Pak., 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 168.  
9 See SGS v. Phil., Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 155. 
10 SGS v. Pak., Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 97. 
 11 See id. ¶¶ 54, 172–73. 
 12 Id. ¶¶ 166–67; see also Matthew Wendlandt, SGS v. Philippines and 
the Role of ICSID Tribunals in Investor-State Contract Disputes, 43 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 523, 541 (2008). 
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intent could be found in the text of the umbrella clause.13  The SGS v. 
Pakistan tribunal also set forth what would become a more “widely 
accepted principle . . . that under general international law, a 
violation of a contract entered into by a State with an investor of 
another State, is not, by itself, a violation of international law.”14   
Three years later, the arbitration tribunal in El Paso v. 
Argentina followed the SGS v. Pakistan tribunal’s view that 
contractual claims could only be transformed to treaty claims if this 
had been stated “clearly and unambiguously.”15  
The tribunals in both SGS v. Pakistan and a case that 
followed shortly after, Joy Mining v. Egypt, applied the Vivendi 
“essential basis” test—distinguishing investment treaty breaches and 
contractual breaches by “the fundamental basis of the claim”—in 
rejecting jurisdiction over contract-based claims.16  This test explains 
that where a claim’s fundamental basis is a BIT, international law is 
applicable; on the other hand, when its fundamental basis is a 
contract, the law applicable to the contract will govern.17  
 
B. EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION 
 
Shortly after the SGS v. Pakistan tribunal reached its 
decision, the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines, another landmark 
decision, reached the opposite conclusion and accepted jurisdiction 
                                                
 13 SGS v. Pak., Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 167.   
 14 Id.; see also Michael Feit, Responsibility of the State under 
International Law for the Breach of Contract Committed by a State-Owned 
Entity, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 142, 152, 161 (2010). 
 15 El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 74 (Apr. 27, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 
488 (2006). 
 16 Id., ¶ 63; Joy Mining Mach., Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 75 (Aug. 6, 2004), 13 ICSID 
Rep. 123 (2008); SGS v. Pak., Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 148 (quoting 
Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine 
Republic, Case No. ARB/97/3, Annulment, ¶ 101 (July 3, 2002), 8 ICSID 
Rep. 490 (2005)). 
 17 Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, Annulment, ¶ 96.  In 
Vivendi, the panel agreed that the “proper law of the contract” for the 
Concession Contract was the law of Tucumán Province, not international law 
rules of arbitration, because Tucumán “possesses separate legal personality 
under its own law and is responsible for the performance of its own 
contracts.”  Id. 
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over contractual claims on the basis that the umbrella clause “makes 
it a breach of the BIT for the host-state to fail to observe binding 
commitments, including contractual commitments, which it has 
assumed with regard to specific investments.” 18   An expansive 
interpretation of umbrella clauses requires that breaches of 
obligations the host-state has undertaken with respect to foreign 
investors are elevated to breaches of the umbrella clause included in 
the investment treaty.  Therefore, a simple breach of a commercial 
contract between a host-state and an investor could be transformed 
into a breach of a treaty.  Article 10 of the Switzerland-Philippines 
BIT stipulates the following umbrella clause:  “[e]ach Contracting 
Party shall observe any obligation it has assumed with regard to 
specific investments in its territory by investors of the other 
Contracting Party.”19  Admittedly, the language of the umbrella 
clause in SGS v. Philippines seems weaker than this of the clause in 
SGS v. Pakistan, which does not mention “specific” investments “in 
[the host-state’s] territory.”  The SGS v. Philippines tribunal even 
makes a reference to the “vaguer terms” of the umbrella clause 
contained in the Swiss-Pakistan BIT.20  However, the slight textual 
differences between umbrella clauses do not satisfactorily explain the 
basis for the split in international investment law.  
Tribunals advancing an expansive construction of umbrella 
clauses have typically relied on Article 31, paragraph 1, of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that a 
treaty must be interpreted (i) in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of its terms in their context and (ii) in light of its objective 
and purpose.21  First, they have pointed out the plain language of 
umbrella clauses, 22  such as the mandatory character of “shall 
                                                
 18 Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 128 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 
ICSID Rep. 518 (2005). 
 19 Id. ¶ 115. 
 20 Id. ¶ 119. 
 21 See Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Pol., Partial Award, ¶ 247 (Aug. 19, 
2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 335 (2007) (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331); Enron Corp. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 273 (May 22, 2007), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf. 
 22 Société Générale Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 168 (Feb. 12, 2010), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1526.pdf. 
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observe” and the broad phrasing of “any obligation,”23 which would 
arguably include not only obligations specified in the investment 
treaty but also purely contractual obligations under national law.24    
Second, and related to this interpretation, is the argument 
under international law that a provision in an international treaty 
must be “interpreted as meaningful rather than meaningless,” and to 
be rendered “effective rather than ineffective.”25  Proponents of an 
expansive interpretation seem to agree that a restrictive interpretation 
would render umbrella clauses redundant.26  The tribunal in SGS v. 
Philippines criticized the SGS v. Pakistan decision in this respect by 
stating that the latter “failed to give any clear meaning to the 
umbrella clause.”27  In SGS v. Paraguay, the umbrella clause was 
similarly interpreted to provide jurisdiction over contract-based 
claims in order “to give purpose and effect to that provision.”28  This 
is also how the ad hoc arbitration tribunal in Eureko B.V. v. Poland 
reached the conclusion that an umbrella clause “must be interpreted 
to mean something in itself,” namely, to include the obligations 
undertaken by the host-state with respect to the investments made by 
foreign investors in accordance with the BIT. 29   The ICSID 
arbitration tribunal in SGS v. Paraguay similarly held that an 
umbrella clause means what it says—“that the State is obliged to 
guarantee the observance of its commitments with respect to the 
investments of the other State party’s investors.”30  The tribunal in 
                                                
 23 See, e.g., Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment & 
Control, BIVAC B.V. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 141 (May 29, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0103.pdf (stating that “[t]he words any 
obligation are all encompassing.”); SGS v. Phil., Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 
115 (citing the language “shall”). 
 24 SGS v. Phil., Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 115; BIVAC B.V. v. Para., 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 141. 
 25 Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Pol., Partial Award, ¶ 248. 
 26 Stephen W. Schill, Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and 
Effect of Umbrella Clauses in International Investment Treaties, 18 MINN. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 39–40 (2009). 
 27 SGS v. Phil., Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 125 (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 28 Société Générale Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 176 (Feb. 12, 2010), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1526.pdf. 
 29 Id. ¶ 249. 
 30 Id. ¶ 168.  
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BIVAC B.V. v. Rep. of Paraguay agreed that “the umbrella clause has 
to be interpreted in such a way as to give it some meaning and 
practical effect.”31  
Third, investment arbitration tribunals adopting an 
expansive interpretation have turned to the objective and purpose of 
the investment treaties in which umbrella clauses are found. 32  
According to the tribunal in Eureko B.V. v. Poland, “the 
encouragement and reciprocal protection of investment” must be read 
into the umbrella clause.33  Therefore, when in doubt, the umbrella 
clause ought to be interpreted in favor of encouraging investment.34  
Allowing for resolution of all disputes arising from the same 
investment by a single forum (i.e., the forum designated in the 
investment treaty) would make foreign investment more attractive for 
investors who might not wish to refer their disputes to the host-state’s 
national courts for fear of bias or an underdeveloped judicial 
system.35  
Finally, proponents of an expansive interpretation have 
traced back the historical origins of umbrella clauses to the 1950s and 
1960s.36  The 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of 
Foreign Property was the first treaty to include an umbrella clause, 
titled “Observance of Undertakings.”37  The commentary to the Draft 
                                                
 31 Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment & Control, 
BIVAC B.V. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 141 (May 29, 2009), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0103.pdf. 
 32 See supra text accompanying notes 21–28. 
 33 Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Pol., Partial Award, ¶ 248 (Aug. 19, 
2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 335 (2007). 
 34 Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 
ICSID Rep. 518 (2005) (citing Treaty between the United States of America 
and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., pmbl., Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124). 
 35 Id. ¶ 132. 
 36 For further discussion, see Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Pol., Partial 
Award, ¶ 251; Jonathan B. Potts, Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Intent, Reliance and Internationalization, 51 
VA. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1008 (2011); Schill, supra note 26, at 36, 55, 56; Wong, 
supra note 7, at 149. 
 37 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, at 13, No. 15,637 
(1962), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/ 
2015 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FROM AN 151 
 EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF UMBRELLA  
 CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
Convention explains that “any right originating under such an 
undertaking gives rise to an international right.”38  The tribunal in 
Eureko B.V. v. Poland emphasizes how scholars in the 1970s and 
1980s have further interpreted the umbrella clause to transform 
contractual obligations into international ones.39  
 
III. THE EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF UMBRELLA  
CLAUSES IN PRACTICE 
 
Although host-states (who have an interest in avoiding 
international law breaches) and foreign investors (who have an 
interest in seeing their claims adjudicated in international forums) are 
likely to continue to disagree on one interpretation, the arguments for 
a broad definition seem to have gained traction with arbitration 
tribunals as is demonstrated by the substantial number of cases 
decided this way.  Instead of fueling the debate, section III will focus 
on what an expansive interpretation of umbrella clauses means in 
practical terms and will consider two questions that are controversial 
within the ranks of supporters of a broad interpretation.  The first 
question relates to what happens when there is an umbrella clause in 
the investment treaty, thereby elevating contractual claims to treaty 
claims, and an exclusive forum selection clause in the contract.  Does 
the dispute resolution mechanism in the investment treaty override 
the forum selection clause in this scenario?  The second question asks 
which types of “obligations” can be brought into the treaty realm.  
Would they need to be contractual or could they have a wider scope 
and include, for example, unilateral promises or statements made by 
the host-state?  
 
A. EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES 
 
In SGS v. Pakistan, the tribunal expressed concern that 
elevating any contractual breach to a treaty breach would “negate 
routine forum selection clauses in thousands of state-investor 
                                                                                           
internationalinvestmentagreements/39286571.pdf.  The umbrella clause 
provided that “[e]ach Party shall at all times ensure the observance of 
undertakings given by it in relation to the property of nationals of another 
Party.”  Id.  
 38 Id. at 14–15. 
 39 Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Pol., Partial Award, ¶ 251 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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contracts.”40  For this reason, a forum selection clause in a contract 
between host-state and foreign investor had to take precedence over 
BIT jurisdiction.  However, expansive interpretations of umbrella 
clauses have varied with respect to their effect on such forum 
selection clauses.  This section distinguishes three scenarios that arise 
once an investment arbitration tribunal has accepted jurisdiction over 
a contractual claim on the basis of the applicable investment treaty’s 
umbrella clause.  First, the contract between the host-state and 
investor does not contain a forum selection clause; consequently, 
there is nothing standing in the way of the tribunal deciding on the 
merits of any contractual claim.  Second, there is an exclusive forum 
selection clause and the tribunal gives the selected forum precedence 
over BIT dispute resolution, meaning that it does not decide the 
merits of the case.  Finally, there is an exclusive forum selection 
clause but the tribunal gives precedence to BIT dispute resolution 
and therefore decides itself the merits of the case. 
The different approaches that tribunals supporting a broad 
interpretation have taken to decipher umbrella clauses are not just 
theoretical; there have been tangible consequences.  For example, in 
BIVAC B.V. v. Paraguay, the tribunal accepted jurisdiction over a 
contractual claim but then declared this claim “inadmissible” because 
of the exclusive forum selection clause in the contract, deflecting a 
decision on the merits of the case to the local courts indicated in the 
forum selection clause.41  Contrarily, in SGS v. Paraguay, a case 
stemming from a similar set of facts, the tribunal ignored the 
exclusive forum selection clause to decide for itself the merits of the 
case.42  It is interesting to contrast the vastly different results of 
BIVAC B.V. v. Paraguay and SGS v. Paraguay with the outcomes of 
the respective poster cases for the restrictive and expansive 
interpretations of umbrella clauses, SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. 
Philippines. Both cases also had an exclusive forum selection clause 
in the underlying contract between the host-state and the foreign 
                                                
 40 Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 56 (Aug. 6, 2003), 
8 ICSID Rep. 406 (2005). 
 41 Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment & Control, 
BIVAC B.V. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 142 (May 29, 2009), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0103.pdf. 
 42 Société Générale Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 185 (Feb. 12, 2010), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1526.pdf. 
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investor .43  Although often perceived to be drastically different,44 the 
outcomes of these two cases were nonetheless largely the same—the 
local courts of the host-state could decide the merits of the investor’s 
contractual claims45—thereby illustrating how the interpretational 
divide runs deeper than a simply restrictive versus expansive 
approach.  
 
1. TRIBUNAL GIVES PRECEDENCE TO THE FORUM 
SELECTION CLAUSE 
 
As it turns out, a number of proponents of an expansive 
interpretation would render an umbrella clause ineffective in the 
presence of an exclusive forum selection clause, including the 
arbitrators in SGS v. Philippines.  In the latter case, by accepting 
jurisdiction over the foreign investor’s contractual claim on the basis 
that the umbrella clause in the Swiss-Philippines BIT rose to a treaty 
claim, the tribunal paved the way for adopting an expansive 
interpretation in case law, while at the same time declaring the 
contractual claim inadmissible because of the forum selection clause 
in the underlying agreement between investor and host-state.46  
As one author astutely observed, “this is to take away with 
one hand what was given with the other, leaving investors no less 
empty-handed than they were under SGS v. Pakistan.”47  Another 
commentator tries to defeat this criticism by pointing out that ICSID 
tribunals should have the freedom to decide the merits of contractual 
claims if they wish, and simply did not think it appropriate in SGS v. 
Philippines.48  A third argues that an exclusive forum selection clause 
should override the BIT dispute resolution mechanism because 
foreign investors should be able to “negotiate more lucrative 
                                                
 43 See Yuval Shany, Notes and Comments, Contract Claims vs. Treaty 
Claims: Mapping Conflicts between ICSID Decisions on Multisourced 
Investment Claims, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 839–42 (2005). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See SGS v. Pak., Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 145–46; Société 
Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 162 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 
518 (2005). 
 46 See Shany, supra note 43, at 842–43. 
 47 Wong, supra note 7, at 165–66. 
 48 Wendlandt, supra note 12, at 552–54. 
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contracts” with the host-state by forfeiting dispute resolution as 
determined in the treaty.49  
In BIVAC v. Paraguay, a case concerning unpaid invoices 
arising from a contract between a Dutch company and the 
Paraguayan Ministry of Finance, the tribunal accepted jurisdiction 
over the Dutch company’s contractual claim.50  However, and similar 
to SGS v. Philippines, it did not decide the merits of the case because 
of the exclusive forum selection clause in the contract where the 
parties had chosen the Tribunals of the City of Asunción.51  Although 
the tribunal declared it had jurisdiction over the contractual claim, it 
considered that claim to be inadmissible, stating that a broad reading 
of the umbrella clause indicated that the entire contract is imported 
into the BIT, including the exclusive forum selection clause.52  The 
tribunal then addressed whether the proceedings should be stayed—
as was done in SGS v. Philippines—or the contractual claim 
dismissed, which would be the normal practice for an inadmissible 
claim.53  The tribunal finally decided that a stay of proceedings was 
the most appropriate way to deal with the issue of admissibility.54  
However, the decision seemed to imply that the contractual claim 
might still become admissible if the forum selected in the contract 
fails to meet “expectations with regard to the sound administration of 
justice.”55  In conclusion, the tribunal appeared to have assumed a 
supervisory role, as had been argued for by the claimant.56   
Another ICSID tribunal came to the same conclusion in 
Bosh International, Inc. v. Ukraine.57  There, the tribunal did not 
need to decide what happens after an umbrella clause is breached 
because the contractual breaches alleged by the claimant were not 
                                                
 49 Potts, supra note 36, at 1042. 
 50 Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment & Control, 
BIVAC B.V. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 142 (May 29, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/ 
files/case-documents/ita0103.pdf. 
 51 Id. ¶ 145. 
 52 Id. ¶ 159. 
 53 Id. ¶ 161. 
 54 Id.  
 55 Id. ¶ 290. 
 56 See id. ¶ 288. 
 57 Bosh Int’l, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11, Award, ¶ 
254 (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1118.pdf.  
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attributable to the host state. 58   However, “for the sake of 
completeness,” the tribunal added that the contractual claim would 
not be allowed because there was an exclusive forum selection clause 
in the contract.59  
 
2. TRIBUNAL GIVES PRECEDENCE TO INVESTMENT TREATY 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
Having ignored the exclusive forum selection clause in the 
underlying contract in favor of BIT dispute resolution, the investment 
arbitration tribunals in Eureko B.V. v. Poland, LG&E Energy Corp. v. 
Argentine Republic, and SGS v. Paraguay on the other hand found 
themselves in a position to decide the merits of the contractual claims 
brought before them.60 
In Eureko v. Poland, the ad hoc arbitration tribunal decided 
that the allegations of contractual breach were admissible despite the 
contract’s exclusive forum selection clause, reasoning that the 
umbrella clause in the Dutch-Polish BIT had the effect of elevating 
the contractual breach to a treaty breach.61  Applying Polish law, the 
tribunal found a breach of the contract, which automatically 
constituted a breach of the treaty’s umbrella clause.62  
                                                
 58 Id. ¶ 178. 
 59 Id. ¶ 250.  “The present Tribunal agrees, and concludes that where a 
contractual claim is asserted under an umbrella clause, the claimant in 
question must comply with any dispute settlement provision included in that 
contract.”  Id. ¶ 252. 
 60 Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Pol., Partial Award, ¶¶ 190–91 (Aug. 19, 
2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 335 (2007); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 132–39 (Oct. 
3, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0460.pdf; Société Générale Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of 
Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 185 (Feb. 12, 
2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1526.pdf. 
 61 Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Pol., Partial Award, ¶ 250.  Article 3.5 of 
the Dutch-Polish BIT provides: “Each Contracting Party shall observe any 
obligations it may have entered into with regard to investments of investors 
of the other Contracting Party.”  Id. ¶ 77.  
 62 See id. ¶ 260.  Interestingly, the decision is accompanied by a strong 
dissent, which asserts that the Tribunal’s findings are wholly incompatible 
with Polish law.  See Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Dissenting Opinion, 
¶ 11. 
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In SGS v. Paraguay, the forum selection clause asserted that 
“[a]ny conflict, controversy or claim deriving from or in connection 
with this Agreement, breach, termination or invalidity, shall be 
submitted to the Courts of the City of Asunción under the Law of 
Paraguay.”63  Although arising from facts similar to those in BIVAC v. 
Paraguay, 64  SGS v. Paraguay had very different practical 
implications.  Instead of giving precedence to the forum selection 
clause, the tribunal stated that directing SGS’s contractual claims to 
the Paraguayan courts would place it “at risk of failing to carry out 
its mandate under the Treaty and the ICSID Convention.”65  The 
tribunal also stressed that it would need “strong cause” not to 
exercise jurisdiction.66  In reaching its conclusion, the tribunal relied 
in part on the Vivendi Annulment decision, which asserted that a 
“[t]ribunal, faced with such a claim and having validly held that it 
had jurisdiction, [is] obliged to consider and to decide it.” 67  
Although the Vivendi Annulment Committee was referring to 
traditional treaty claims,68 the tribunal in SGS v. Paraguay had no 
reservations in applying their reasoning, because it considered the 
contractual breaches to amount to breaches of the treaty’s umbrella 
clause.69  Thus, contractual claims brought under an umbrella clause 
are, in the tribunal’s view, treaty claims.70  Unless it can be shown 
                                                
 63 SGS v. Para., Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 126. 
64 Both cases involved foreign companies that had contracted with the 
Paraguayan Ministry of Finance to perform certification and pre-shipment 
inspection services for cargoes but were note paid after mutual termination of 
their respective contracts.  See Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, 
Assessment & Control, BIVAC B.V. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/9, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 160 (May 29, 2009), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0103.pdf. 
 65 Id. ¶ 172. 
 66 Id. ¶ 175. 
 67 Id. ¶ 171.  
 68 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. 
Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/97/3, Annulment, ¶ 11 (July 3, 2002), 8 
ICSID Rep. 490 (2005); SGS v. Para., Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 142. 
 69 “Even if the alleged breach of the treaty obligation depends upon a 
showing that a contract or other qualifying commitment has been breached, 
the source of the obligation cited by the claimant, and hence the source of the 
claim, remains the treaty itself.”  SGS v. Para., Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 
142. 
 70 Id. 
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that the parties clearly intended to exclude BIT jurisdiction, the 
tribunal will decide the merits of the case.71 
Finally, in LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, the 
tribunal again made its decision based on the merits of the 
contractual claim.  The arbitrators began their analysis by stating that 
umbrella clauses award “extra protection” to a state’s obligations 
towards foreign investors, without addressing whether or not the 
contractual forum selection clause should be applied.72  It then went 
straight to the merits of the investor’s claim, deciding that Argentina 
had breached the obligations it had undertaken with respect to the 
claimant by repealing the statutory scheme it had constructed to 
attract foreign investors for its gas distribution sector.73  
The aforementioned cases show that when a host-state 
enters into contractual obligations with a foreign investor, inserting 
an exclusive forum selection clause in the contract does not 
necessarily guarantee that the courts designated in such a clause will 
adjudicate potential disputes arising from the contract.74  The dispute 
resolution mechanism agreed to in the BIT may very well supersede 
the exclusive forum selection clause in the contract.75  Because it is 
generally in a state’s interest to have its own local courts deal with 
these contractual disputes, the host-state should be aware of this risk.   
 
B. SCOPE OF OBLIGATIONS AFFECTED 
 
A second contentious point amongst supporters of a broad 
interpretation concerns the scope of umbrella clauses.  In other words, 
which types of obligations can be brought under the umbrella clause?  
There appears to be a consensus that contractual obligations relating 
to investments would qualify.76  As early as 2006, the tribunal in 
                                                
71 Id. ¶¶ 179–80. 
 72 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 170 (Oct. 3, 2006), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0460.pdf. 
 73 Id. ¶¶ 171–174. 
74 See SGS v. Para., Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 138–39.  
 75 For further arguments in support of this interpretation, see Wong, 
supra note 7, at 136–37. 
 76 Bosh Int’l, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11, Award, ¶¶ 
231, 248 (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1118.pdf; see also Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, 
Assessment & Control, BIVAC B.V. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. 
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LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic pointed out that multiple 
tribunals—referring inter alia to the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines—
“have concluded that the breach of a contractual obligation in a 
contract between the State and an investor gives rise to a claim under 
the umbrella clause.”77  Also illustrative is the more recent ICSID 
case of Bosh International, Inc. v. Ukraine, where the tribunal 
followed the decision on jurisdiction in BIVAC B.V. v. Paraguay’s as 
to include contractual obligations  in the types covered by umbrella 
clauses.78    
Several authors would moreover go beyond purely 
contractual arrangements to include other types of commitments, 
such as unilateral promises or legislation implemented to induce 
foreign investment. 79   Others believe there should be a clearer 
delineation, as illustrated by one scholar’s criticism of the LG&E 
Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic decision to include regulatory 
measures entered into by the host-state under the umbrella clause’s 
definition of obligations: “[i]t would be a startling proposition in any 
system of contract law that the regulatory system is a part of the 
contract, unless[,] of course, they were mandatory provisions that 
required their incorporation into contracts.”80 
Investment arbitration tribunals have generally tried to strike 
a balance.  For example, in determining the proper scope of the 
words “any obligation” in the Swiss-Philippines BIT umbrella clause, 
the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines emphasized that the legal 
obligation “must have been assumed vis-à-vis the specific 
investment—not as a matter of the application of some legal 
                                                                                           
ARB/07/9, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 142 (May 29, 2009), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0103.pdf. 
 77 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, ¶ 
171. 
 78 Bosh v. Ukraine, Award, ¶ 252. 
 79 Megan Wells Sheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe 
to Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 510 (2011); Schill, 
supra note 26, at 84–85, 89; Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-
State Contracts, Host-State “Commitments” and the Myth of Stability in 
International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 361, 377 (2013). 
 80 El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Republic of Arg., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/15, Legal Opinion of M. Sornarajah, ¶ 96 (Mar. 5, 2007), 
https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-
content/uploads/arbitrationlawita0970.pdf.  
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obligation of a general character.”81  The tribunal in LG&E Energy 
Corp. v. Argentine Republic seemed to support this proposition when 
it concluded that Argentina had implemented a statutory framework 
that was targeted directly at attracting foreign investors to fund the 
privatization of the country’s natural gas industry.82  The tribunal 
held that a violation of these guarantees amounted to a violation of 
the umbrella clause, stipulating that “[e]ach party shall observe any 
obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments.”83   
In Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, 84  a case 
where the same statutory framework was at issue, the tribunal 
similarly concluded that Argentina’s abrogation of its obligations 
undertaken through regulatory measures constituted a breach of the 
umbrella clause in the Argentina-U.S. BIT.85  Notably, the tribunal 
distinguished “conduct that only a sovereign State function or power 
could effect” from “ordinary commercial breaches,” the latter of 
which would not constitute treaty breaches.86  Not every contractual 
dispute would therefore be eligible for BIT dispute resolution; a 
purely contractual dispute over non-payment, for example, would 
arguably not be included in the umbrella clause’s scope.87 
In a series of decisions concerning Argentina’s privatization 
of natural gas distribution, the tribunal in Enron Corp. v. Argentine 
Republic once more confirmed that both the contract between host-
state and investor, as well as the legal framework that Argentina put 
into place to attract foreign investors, constituted “obligations” that 
                                                
 81 Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 121 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 
ICSID Rep. 518 (2005). 
 82 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 
174–75. 
 83 Id. ¶ 169. 
 84 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Application for 
Annulment of the Award, (June 29, 2010), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0776.pdf.  The 
Award in this case was later annulled for reasons not related to the umbrella 
clause.   
 85 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 314 (Sep. 28, 2007), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0770.pdf.  
 86 Id. ¶ 310. 
 87 Id. 
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had been elevated through the umbrella clause in the Argentina-U.S. 
BIT.88 
Finally, the investor in SGS v. Paraguay alleged that in 
addition to contractual breaches, breaches of the “oral and written 
commitments” made by Paraguayan officials that outstanding 
amounts would be paid constituted breaches of the umbrella clause.89  
The tribunal in its preliminary decision on jurisdiction agreed with 
SGS that “Paraguay failed to observe commitments it allegedly made 
to SGS, both under the contract and under its alleged subsequent oral 
and written promises to make good on the claimed debt to SGS.”90  
In its award on the merits two years later, the tribunal nonetheless 
concluded that “it need not resolve these matters [of extra-contractual 
statements]” since their “breach would not result in any additional 
liability” on top of the contractual breach.91 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
 
The expansive interpretation of umbrella clauses, which has 
the sweeping effect of transforming breaches of obligations a state 
has entered into with regard to specific investments to breaches of 
international law, has won significant support over the last ten years.  
Its adoption has nonetheless produced varied results, as has been 
demonstrated in this article by listing the different ways investment 
arbitration tribunals have dealt with exclusive forum selection 
clauses contained in the underlying investment contracts, and by 
comparing arbitrators’ diverging opinions on the scope of obligations 
affected.  By laying out the practical implications resulting from 
broad interpretations of umbrella clauses, the author has tried to 
present a workable framework for states and investors to consider 
when entering into contractual or other agreements relating to foreign 
investments, or when negotiating investment treaties.  In this respect, 
                                                
 88 Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 
277 (May 22, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0293.pdf. 
 89 Société Générale Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 167 (Feb. 12, 2010), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1526.pdf. 
 90 Id. ¶ 171.  
 91 Société Générale Surveillance S.A.  v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/29, Award, ¶ 158 (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1525.pdf.  
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a foreign investor should be aware that it might not have an 
international avenue for bringing its claims when allowing a forum 
selection clause into its contract with a state.  Notwithstanding their 
broad reading of umbrella clauses, several international investment 
tribunals have referred such disputes to the respective contractually 
selected courts.92  At the same time, states should take into account 
that an exclusive forum selection clause does not necessarily shield it 
from investment treaty dispute resolution.93  Sovereigns are moreover 
advised to take note of the possibility that they may have an 
obligation under international law to keep their promises made to 
investors through unilateral statements94 or regulatory measures.95  
By carefully considering the above parameters, both states and 








                                                
 92 See generally Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of 
the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, (Jan. 29, 
2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005); Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, 
Assessment & Control, BIVAC B.V. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/9, Objections to Jurisdiction, (May 29, 2009), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0103.pdf; Bosh 
Int’l, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11, Award, (Oct. 25, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1118.pdf. 
 93 See generally Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Pol., Partial Award, (Aug. 
19, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 335 (2007); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, (Oct. 3, 2006), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0460.pdf; 
Société Générale Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, (Feb. 12, 2010), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1526.pdf. 
 94 See generally SGS v. Para., Decision on Jurisdiction. 
 95 See generally Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, (Sep. 28, 2007), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0770.pdf; Enron 
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